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Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole of
all agents' types. Since agents' types are modelled as their private information,
what the designer can do is to construct a mechanism and choose an outcome after
observing a specic prole of agents' strategies. Traditionally, the designer has no
way to adjust agents' types and hence may be in a dilemma in the sense that even
if she is not satised with some outcome, she has to announce it because she must
obey the mechanism designed by herself. In this paper, we consider a generalized
case where agents' types are adjustable. After dening a series of notions such as
adjusted types, optimal adjustment cost and protably Bayesian implementability,
we propose that the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility does not hold in
this generalized case. Finally, we construct an auction example to show that the
designer can obtain an expected prot greater than the maximum prot that she
can obtain in the traditional optimal auction.
Key words: Mechanism design; Optimal auction; Bayesian Nash implementation.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1{3], there are one designer
and some agents. 1 The designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole of
agents' types. However, agents' types are modelled as their private properties
and unknown to the designer. In order to implement the social choice function,
 Corresponding author.
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1 The designer is denoted as \She", and the agent is denoted as \He".
the designer constructs a mechanism which species each agent's strategy set
(i:e:, the allowed actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i:e:, a rule
for how agents' actions get turned into a social choice).
Traditionally, in a mechanism the designer has no way to adjust agents' types
and hence may be in a dilemma: Even if some prole of agents' strategies leads
to an outcome with low prot, she has to announce it because she must obey
the mechanism designed by herself. The designer may improve her situation
by holding a charity auction. Engers and McManus [4] proposed that agents'
bids in a rst-price charity auction are greater than those in a standard (non-
charity) auction [5] because of the charitable benet that winners receive from
their own payments. Besides the charity auction, there may exist another way
for the designer to escape from the dilemma.
For example, suppose the designer is an auctioneer who sells a good, and
each agent is a bidder whose initial valuation to the good (i:e:, private type)
is low. In order to obtain more prot, the designer announces that she will
rent a luxurious hotel to hold this auction. The gorgeousness of the hotel is
an open signal to all agents that reects the expensiveness of the sold good,
and hence induces each agent to adjust his valuation to the good. Without
loss of generality, we assume that each agent's valuation and bid both increase
concavely with the rent cost spent by the designer, and the designer's utility is
a linear function of the winner agent's bid. From the viewpoint of the designer,
as long as her marginal utility is greater than her marginal cost, it is worthwhile
for her to continue investing on the rent cost. Obviously, the designer will
obtain the maximum prot when her marginal utility is equal to her marginal
cost. Thus, if agents' types are adjustable, the designer may actively escape
from the above-mentioned dilemma and yield an outcome better than what
would happened without doing so.
In this paper, we generalize the mechanism design theory to a case where
agents' types are adjustable. In Section 2, we dene a series of notions such as
adjusted types, optimal adjustment cost, protably Bayesian implementability
and so on. Then we propose that the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility
does not hold in this generalized case. In Section 3, we construct an example
to show that by adjusting agents' types, the designer can obtain an expected
prot greater than what she can obtain at most in the traditional optimal
auction model.
2 Theoretical analysis
Following Section 23.B of MWG's textbook [1], we consider a setting with one
designer and I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Let X be a set of possible
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alternatives.
Assumption 1: Each agent i is assumed to observe a private parameter (i:e:,
type i) which determines his preference over alternatives in X. Let i be the
set of agent i's all possible types. Let  = 1  I ,  = (1;    ; I) 2 .
Denition 1: For any x 2 X, each agent i's utility is denoted as ui(x; i) 2 R,
where i 2 i, and the designer's utility is denoted as ud(x) 2 R.
Denition 23.B.1 [1]: A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : ! X
that, for each possible prole of the agents' types  2 , assigns a collective
choice f() 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3 [1]: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI , g()) is a collection of
I strategy sets S1;    ; SI , and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
A strategy of each agent i in   is a function si() : i ! Si. Let s() =
(s1();    ; sI()). The outcome function is also denoted as g(s()) : ! X.
Assumption 2: Assume that in a mechanism, each agent i can play his
strategy si without any cost. Hence agent i's prot from the outcome x is just
his utility ui(x; i).
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Assumption 3: Assume that in a mechanism, the designer announces a cost
c  0 as an open signal to all agents which she will spend to perform the
outcome function. Thus, the outcome function is denoted as gc(), and the
mechanism is denoted as  c = (S1;    ; SI , gc()). After knowing the cost c,
each agent i adjusts his private type from the initial value 0i 2 i to a new
value ci 2 i. 3 The cost c is also denoted as adjustment cost.
Denition 2: For any adjustment cost c  0 and each agent i's initial type
0i 2 i, by assumption 3 each agent i's preference over the alternatives in X
is determined by his adjusted type ci 2 i. For each i = 1;    ; I, let
0 = (01;    ; 0I ) 2 ;
0 i = (
0
1;    ; 0i 1; 0i+1;    ; 0I );
c = (c1;    ; cI) 2 ;
c i = (
c
1;    ; ci 1; ci+1;    ; cI):
2 For example, suppose that each agent is a bidder in an auction, then each agent
can be considered to submit his bid to the auctioneer without any cost.
3 An example can be seen in Section 3, where the designer announces some cost to
rent a hotel to hold an auction. The gorgeousness of the hotel (i:e:, the hotel's rent
price) is a signal that the designer sends to agents in order to show the expensiveness
of the sold good, although sometimes the designer may deliberately rent a luxurious
hotel to deceive agents and sell a poor good. After observing the signal, each agent
adjusts his private valuation to the good.
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A type adjustment function is denoted as (; c) :   R+ ! , in which
(; 0) =  for any  2 , i:e: zero adjustment cost means no type adjustment.
Let c = (0; c). Let 0(0) = (01(
0
1);    ; 0I(0I )) be the probability density
function of initial type prole 0 2 , and c(c) = (c1(c1);    ; cI(cI)) be
the probability density function of adjusted type prole c 2 . For each
i = 1;    ; I, let
0 i(
0
 i) = (
0
1(
0
1);    ; 0i 1(0i 1); 0i+1(0i+1);    ; 0I(0I ));
c i(
c
 i) = (
c
1(
c
1);    ; ci 1(ci 1); ci+1(ci+1);    ; cI(cI)):
Denition 23.D.1 [1]: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all agent
i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (1)
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2 [1]: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Assumption 4: For any  2  and adjustment cost c  0, the designer is
assumed to know type adjustment function (; c), the initial type distribution
0() and the adjusted type distribution c().
Denition 3: For any c  0, given an SCF f and 0(), the designer's expected
utility is denoted as ud(c) = Ecud(f(
c)), and her initial expected utility is
denoted as ud(0) = E0ud(f(
0)).
Denition 4: For any c  0, given an SCF f and 0(), the designer's expected
prot is denoted as pd(c) = ud(c)  c, and her initial expected prot is denoted
as pd(0) = ud(0).
Assumption 5: ud(c) is assumed to be a concave function that satises the
following inequalities,
@ud(c)
@c
> 0;
@2ud(c)
@c2
< 0; for any c  0: 4
4 See the example given in Section 3. When each agent i's adjusted type is a square
root function of the designer's cost as specied by Eq(5) and the social choice
function is specied by Eq(6), then the inequalities in Assumption 5 holds.
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Proposition 1: If there exists an adjustment cost c  0 such that
@ud(c)
@c

c=c
= 1; i:e:
@pd(c)
@c

c=c
= 0;
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected prot pd(c
) at c = c.
c is denoted as the optimal adjustment cost, and by assumption 5 there holds
@ud(c)
@c

c=0
 1; i:e: @pd(c)
@c

c=0
 0:
Proposition 2: If the designer's expected utility ud(c) and expected prot
pd(c) satisfy the following condition,
@ud(c)
@c

c=0
< 1; i:e:
@pd(c)
@c

c=0
< 0; (2)
then the designer will obtain the maximum expected prot at c = 0.
Denition 5: Given an SCF f and 0(), f is protably Bayesian imple-
mentable if the following conditions are satised:
1) The optimal adjustment cost c > 0, which means that the distribution of
agents' private types is adjusted from 0() to c().
2) There exist a mechanism  c

= (S1;    ; SI ; gc()) and a strategy prole
s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that:
(i) For all agent i and all c

i 2 i,
Ec i [ui(g
c(si (
c
i ); s

 i(
c
 i)); 
c
i )jc

i ]  Ec i [ui(g
c(s^i; s

 i(
c
 i)); 
c
i )jc

i ] (3)
for all s^i 2 Si. 5
(ii) gc

(s()) = f() for all  2 .
Proposition 3: Given an SCF f and 0(), if f is protably Bayesian imple-
mentable, then the designer's expected prot at the optimal adjustment cost
is greater than her initial expected prot.
Proof : Given that f is protably Bayesian implementable, then the optimal
adjustment cost c > 0. By Proposition 1, pd(c) > pd(0). 2
Denition 23.B.5 [1]: A direct mechanism is a mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ,
g0()) in which S 0i = i for all i and g0() = f() for all  2 .
5 Note that in Formula (3), the probability density function of type prole
c

 i = (
c
1 ;    ; c

i 1; 
c
i+1;    ; c

I ) is 
c
 i(). As a comparison, in the tradi-
tional notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Denition 23.D.1), there is no
type adjustment. Thus, the probability density function of type prole  i =
(1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; I) in Formula (1) is just 0 i().
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Denition 23.D.3 [1]: The social choice function f() is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (or Bayesian incentive compatible) if
s0i (i) = i for all i 2 i (i = 1;    ; I) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()), in which S 0i = i, g0 = f . That is,
if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (4)
for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 4: Given an SCF f and 0(), if f is protably Bayesian im-
plementable, then it cannot be inferred that f is truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. That is, the notion of Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility does not hold in this generalized case.
Proof : Given that f is protably Bayesian implementable, then the optimal
adjustment cost c > 0. Note that Formula (3) is based on the type distribu-
tion c

() (see Footnote 5), hence the designer's expected prot is pd(c).
By Denition 23.D.3, in the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility, there
is a direct mechanism  0 = (S 01;    ; S 0I ; g0()) (in which S 0i = i, g0 = f), and
s0() =  (in which  2 ) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of  0. By Denition
23.B.5, there is no type adjustment in the direct mechanism. Thus, Formula
(4) is based on the type distribution 0(), hence the designer's expected prot
is pd(0).
Since 0() is distinct from c(), thus Formula (4) cannot be inferred from
Formula (3). Therefore, it cannot be inferred that f is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the notion of Bayesian incentive
compatibility does not hold in this generalized case. 2
3 Example
Following the auction model in MWG's book (Page 863, [1]), suppose that
there are one designer and two agents. Let the designer be an auctioneer who
wants to sell a good, and each agent be a bidder whose valuation to the good
is i  0, i:e:, i = R+. Suppose the designer holds the auction in a gorgeous
hotel. We consider a rst-price-sealed-bid auction setting: Each agent i is
allowed to submit a sealed bid bi  0. The bids are then opened, and the
agent with the higher bid gets the good, and must pay money equal to his bid
to the auctioneer.
Suppose that:
1) Each agent i's initial valuation (i:e:, his initial type) 0i is drawn indepen-
dently from the uniform distribution on [0; 1]. The distribution is known by
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the designer but the exact value of each 0i is agent i's private information.
2) The designer spends cost c  0 to rent the hotel.
3) The gorgeousness of hotel denotes the auction environment. Each agent i's
valuation to the good is inuenced by the gorgeousness of the hotel. The more
expensive the rent cost is, the greater the bidder's valuation to the good is.
4) Let  > 0 be a coecient, each agent i's valuation to the good (i:e:, his
adjusted type ci ) is a square root function of the cost c,
ci = (1 + 
p
c)0i : (5)
Thus,
@ci
@c
=
0i
2
p
c
;
@2ci
@c2
=  
0
i
4
c 3=2:
That is, for any c  0, the following formulas hold:
@ci
@c

c=0
= +1; @
c
i
@c
> 0;
@2ci
@c2
< 0:
Let  = (1; 2), consider the social choice function
f() = (y1(); y2(); yd(); t1(); t2(); td()); (6)
in which
y1() = 1; if 1  2; = 0 if 1 < 2
y2() = 1; if 1 < 2; = 0 if 1  2
yd() = 0; for all  2 
t1() =  1y1()=2
t2() =  2y2()=2
td() = [1y1() + 2y2()]=2:
The subscript d stands for the designer, and the subscript 1; 2 stands for the
agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. yi = 1 means that agent i gets the good. ti
denotes agent i's payment to the designer.
Now we will investigate whether this social choice function is Bayesian im-
plementable. We will look for an equilibrium in which each agent i's strategy
bi() takes the form bi(ci ) = ici = i(1 + 
p
c)0i for i 2 [0; 1].
Suppose that agent 2's strategy has this form, and consider agent 1's problem.
For each possible c1, agent 1 wants to solve the following problem:
max
b10
(c1   b1)Prob(b2(c2)  b1):
Because agent 2's highest possible bid is 2(1 + 
p
c) when 02 = 1, it is
evident that agent 1's bid b1 should never more than 2(1 + 
p
c). Since 02 is
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uniformly distributed on [0; 1], and b2(
c
2) = 2(1 + 
p
c)02  b1 if and only if
02  b1=[2(1 + 
p
c)], hence we can write agent 1's problem as:
max
0b12(1+pc)
(c1   b1)b1
2(1 + 
p
c)
The solution to this problem is
b1(
c
1) =
8<:c1=2; if 01=2  22(1 + pc); if 01=2 > 2 :
Similarly,
b2(
c
2) =
8<:c2=2; if 02=2  11(1 + pc); if 02=2 > 1 :
Letting 1 = 2 = 1=2, we see that the strategies b

i (
c
i ) = 
c
i=2 for i = 1; 2
constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this mechanism. Thus, there is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this mechanism that indirectly yields the out-
comes specied by the social choice function f(), and hence f() is Bayesian
Nash implementable.
Let us consider the designer's expected prot:
pd(c) = (1 + 
p
c)E[01y1(
c) + 02y2(
c)]=2  c:
The designer's problem is to choose an optimal adjustment cost c  0 to
maximize her expected prot, i:e:,
max
c0
(1 + 
p
c)E[01y1(
c) + 02y2(
c)]=2  c
According to Appendix A, the designer's initial expected prot is pd(0) =
E[01y1(
c) + 02y2(
c)]=2 = 1=3. Thus, the designer's problem is reformulated
as:
max
c0
(1 + 
p
c)=3  c
It can be easily derived that the optimal adjustment cost c = 2=36. By Def-
inition 5, f() is protably Bayesian implementable. The maximum expected
prot of the designer is:
pd(c
) = (1 + 
p
c)=3  c = 1
3
(1 +
2
12
):
Obviously, when  >
p
3, there exists pd(c
) > 5=12. Note that the designer's
maximum expected prot in the optimal auction with two bidders is 5=12 (see
Page 23, the ninth line from the bottom, Ref [6]). Therefore, by adjusting
agents' types, the designer can obtain an expected prot greater than the
maximum expected prot given by the traditional optimal auction.
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The expected prot of the winner agent i is:
E[ui(f(
c); c

i )] = E[
c
i   bi (c

i )] = E[
0
i ](1 + 
p
c)=2 =
1
4
(1 +
2
6
) >
1
4
:
It can be seen that the winner's expected prot is also increased when agents'
types are adjustable.
4 Conclusions
Traditionally, agents' types are considered as private and endogenous values,
which means that the designer has no way to know and adjust each agent's
type. Thus, although the designer constructs a mechanism in order to im-
plement her favorite social choice function, she behaves just like a passive
observer after receiving a prole of agents' strategies: i:e:, she must obey the
mechanism and announce the outcome specied by the outcome function, no
matter whether she is satised with the outcome or not.
This paper generalizes the traditional mechanism design theory to a case where
agents' types can be adjusted by the designer. In the generalized case, by
adjusting agents' types the designer behaves just like an active modulator who
can choose an optimal adjustment cost and maximize her expected prot.
In Section 2, we dene a series of notions such as adjusted types, optimal
adjustment cost, protably Bayesian implementability and so on. Then we
propose that the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility does not hold in
this generalized case. In Section 3, we construct a model to show that by
adjusting agents' types, the designer can obtain an expected prot greater
than the maximum expected prot yielded by the traditional optimal auction.
At the same time, the winner agent's expected prot is also increased.
Appendix
As specied in Section 3, 01 and 
0
2 are drawn independently from the uniform
distribution on [0; 1]. Let Z be a random variable dened as Z = 01y1(
c) +
02y2(
c).
f01(z) =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
1; z 2 [0; 1]
0; z > 1
:
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F01(z) = Probf01  zg =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
z; z 2 [0; 1]
1; z > 1
:
FZ(z) = [F01(z)]
2 =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
z2; z 2 [0; 1]
1; z > 1
:
Therefore,
fZ(z) =
8>><>>:
0; z < 0
2z; z 2 [0; 1]
0; z > 1
:
As a result,
E(Z) =
Z 1
0
z  2zdz =
Z 1
0
2z2dz = 2=3:
Therefore, E[01y1(
c)+ 02y2(
c)]=2 = 1=3. According to Eq (6), the designer's
initial expected prot and utility are pd(0) = ud(0) = 1=3.
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